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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a foreign citizen. You have been injured in a foreign 
country due to the negligence of a U.S. company and have a legitimate tort 
claim for millions of dollars against the company. You file suit in the state 
court in Missoula, Montana—located at 200 W. Broadway, Missoula, 
Montana 59802.1 The defendant company removes the case, on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship, to the United States District Court of Montana—
located at 201 E. Broadway, Missoula, Montana 598022—and argues that the 
case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The 
state court probably would not have granted the motion, but rather would 
have allowed the case to proceed to the merits.3 But now that the case has 
been moved just two blocks away4 to a federal district court, that court can 
exercise its discretion under federal forum non conveniens doctrine and 
dismiss the case.5 This sequence of events does not occur infrequently.6 
 
1 4th Judicial District, MONT. JUD. BRANCH, http://courts.mt.gov/locator/dist4.mcpx (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V45-3E4G. 
2 Missoula Courthouse, U.S. DISTRICT CT. DISTRICT MONT., http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/ 
missoula.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FL9C-JA2J. 
3 Montana has explicitly ruled out forum non conveniens in Federal Employers Liability Act 
(FELA) cases, see Rule v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 106 P.3d 533, 536 (Mont. 2005), and 
has not decided whether the doctrine has general applicability, see State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. 
Co. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498 (Mont. 1995) (noting that Montana has not yet “accepted nor 
rejected” whether parties can argue forum non conveniens in any context). 
4 Driving Directions from 200 W Broadway St., Missoula, MT 59802 to 201 E Broadway St., 
Missoula, MT 59802, MAPQUEST, http://www.mapquest.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; 
then search “A” for “200 W Broadway St., Missoula, MT 59802” and search “B” for “201 E Broadway 
St., Missoula, MT 59802”; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink). 
5 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (noting that district courts can 
dismiss cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens “where trial in the plaintiff ’s chosen 
forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to 
offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 
U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947) (accepting the power of district courts to dismiss cases under the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens). 
6 For one example, see Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Company, 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 
474 U.S. 948 (1985). There, the defendants properly removed the case to federal court in Florida 
and moved for dismissal under the federal rule of forum non conveniens. Id. at 1216. At the time of 
the suit, Florida’s forum non conveniens doctrine precluded dismissal where one of the parties to 
the suit was a Florida resident. Id. at 1217. Hence, because the plaintiff was a resident of Florida, 
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Because almost every federal court applies federal forum non conveniens 
law in diversity cases,7 defendants can remove cases to federal court solely 
for the purpose of getting them dismissed on forum non conveniens 
grounds. In cases where a state would not dismiss under its own forum non 
conveniens doctrine, it is unfair for defendants to exploit removal to obtain 
dismissal. Allowing defendants to engage in this practice undercuts the rights 
of the parties and undermines the purpose of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine. 
The appropriate remedy is for courts to find that defendants who  
remove from state court waive their right to argue forum non conveniens in 
federal court when the state would not have dismissed the case under its 
forum non conveniens law. This would prevent the injustice of defendants 
using removal as a mechanism for dismissal. However, courts may be 
unwilling to adopt waiver. Ultimately, I propose that Congress remedy this 
injustice by amending the removal statute to permit remand to the state 
court when the federal court dismisses on forum non conveniens grounds. 
In this Comment, I discuss the inequities of the current system and why 
my proposal would remedy this injustice. In Part I, I trace the development 
of the forum non conveniens doctrine and delineate its importance in cases 
today. In Part II, I explain how the decision of most federal courts to use 
federal forum non conveniens law in diversity cases creates an inequity that 
has effects beyond the forum non conveniens inquiry. Finally, in Part III, I 
propose that the proper remedy is to impute waiver of forum non conveniens 
arguments to defendants who remove a case from a state that would not 
have dismissed under its forum non conveniens doctrine. The courts could 
do this themselves by adopting waiver into the common law. But ultimately, 
to remedy this inequity, Congress should amend the removal statute to 
require remand to state court, rather than outright dismissal, when a federal 
court concludes that it is an inconvenient forum. 
 
the state court likely would have allowed the case to proceed to the merits. Id. at 1219. The 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that application of the federal rule would change the outcome of 
the case, but decided that it was nevertheless appropriate to use the federal standard and upheld 
the district court’s dismissal for federal forum non conveniens. Id. 
7 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE 
A. The Origins of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the discretion of both state and 
federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.8 
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the Court acknowledged the availability of 
forum non conveniens doctrine as a tool to dismiss cases in federal court.9 
The forum non conveniens inquiry was formulated as an equitable test 
focusing on the unfairness associated with having the dispute heard in a 
particular forum, with the plaintiff ’s choice of forum rarely disturbed.10 
Rather than articulating a particular rule, the Court instead enumerated a 
list of private considerations—directed to the dynamics of the lawsuit—and 
public considerations—directed to the community’s interest in the resolu-
tion of the dispute—for courts to consider in forum non conveniens deter-
minations.11 However, to trigger the doctrine’s application, a court must first 
find that an adequate alternative forum exists.12 
The question of what qualifies as an adequate alternative became the 
central inquiry in the Court’s next major forum non conveniens case, Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.13 There, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit in 
California state court arising out of a plane crash that occurred in Scotland.14 
 
8 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1935) (recognizing that states may limit the 
jurisdiction of their courts as long as the limitation does not conflict with provisions of the federal 
Constitution); Can. Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932) (“Obviously, the 
proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true . . . .”). 
9 330 U.S. at 507 (“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist 
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general 
venue statute.”). 
10 Id. at 508 (suggesting the plaintiff ’s choice of forum will normally not be disturbed unless 
used to “‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not 
necessary to [the plaintiff ’s] right to pursue his remedy”); see also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249 
(“Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff ’s chosen forum 
imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer 
any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.”). 
11 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09 (listing private interest factors such as “ease of access to sources 
of proof,” “availability of compulsory process,” and “cost of obtaining attendance of [] witnesses” 
and public interest factors such as “[a]dministrative difficulties” and “[j]ury duty” as relevant in 
the forum non conveniens analysis); see also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 (“[T]he Court [in 
Gilbert] provided a list of ‘private interest factors’ affecting the convenience of the litigants, and a 
list of ‘public interest factors’ affecting the convenience of the forum.”). 
12 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07 (“In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to 
process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.”). 
13 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
14 Id. at 238-40. 
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The defendants removed the case to federal court and obtained a transfer to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.15 
The defendants then moved for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, arguing that Scotland was the more appropriate forum.16 The 
plaintiff opposed this motion, contending that dismissal would be unfair 
because Scottish law was significantly less favorable than California law.17 
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendants, holding that Scotland 
was an adequate alternative forum and that dismissal for forum non  
conveniens was therefore appropriate.18 The Court recognized that because 
the central focus of Gilbert’s forum non conveniens inquiry was convenience, 
“dismissal [could] not be barred solely because of the possibility of an 
unfavorable change in law.”19 The Court further noted the need to retain 
flexibility in the doctrine,20 thereby solidifying forum non conveniens as a 
discretionary tool by which district courts can dismiss inconvenient litiga-
tion when the balance of inequities strongly favors the defendant. 
B. The Continuing Importance of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
Section 1404 empowers a federal district court to transfer a case to an-
other district court in which the case could have been filed originally when 
doing so furthers the interests of convenience and justice.21 A district court’s 
latitude to grant a transfer under § 1404(a) has been interpreted to be much 
greater than its latitude to dismiss under forum non conveniens.22 Modern 
transfer procedures have effectively eliminated the use of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine in cases where the alternative forum is another U.S. 
 
15 Id. at 240-41. 
16 Id. at 241-42. 
17 Id. at 244. 
18 Id. at 261. 
19 Id. at 249. 
20 Id.; see also Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (declining to identify specific circumstances that  
require a forum non conveniens dismissal); Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 
556-57 (1946) (noting that the applicability of the forum non conveniens doctrine turns on the 
facts of each case). 
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (“[T]he 
purpose of [§ 1404(a)] is to prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect litigants, 
witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . . .’” (quoting Cont’l 
Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960))). 
22 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 253 (“District courts [a]re given more discretion to transfer 
under § 1404(a) than they ha[ve] to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.” (citing Norwood 
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955))). But see Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 
S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013) (suggesting that courts should treat arguments for transfer under § 1404(a) 
and dismissal under forum non conveniens almost identically). 
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district court.23 Nevertheless, the federal forum non conveniens doctrine is 
still applicable where the alternative forum is a foreign court.24 
The continued vitality of forum non conveniens in cases involving for-
eign events is especially important as the world increasingly moves toward 
international harmonization. Countries have adopted similar commercial 
and legal standards to facilitate cooperation.25 Globalization will likely lead 
to more international disputes filed in U.S. courts.26 And because these 
disputes usually involve non-U.S. citizens, they will often end up in federal 
courts27 and implicate the doctrine of forum non conveniens.28 
Furthermore, foreign plaintiffs have both opportunity and incentive to file 
in U.S. courts. Foreign plaintiffs generally prefer to file in the United States 
to benefit from the procedural advantages—including extensive pretrial 
discovery, contingency fees, and efficient resolution and enforcement of 
judgments—as well as the substantive advantages—including plaintiff-friendly 
 
23 See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (“[T]he federal doctrine of forum 
non conveniens has continuing application only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad.”). 
24 See id. The Supreme Court has recognized that federal forum non conveniens may also 
apply where the alternative forum is a state or territorial court, see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. 
Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007), but forum non conveniens generally does more 
work in cases involving foreign parties and foreign disputes. 
25 For example, in March 2013, the United States updated its patent system from a first-to-
invent to a first-to-file system to better align with the standard employed by the rest of the world. 
See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act and 
Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 528 (2013) (explaining that efficiency and international 
harmonization were driving factors in enacting the America Invents Act); Patrick M. Boucher, 
Recent Developments in US Patent Law, PHYSICS TODAY, Jan. 2012, at 27 (recognizing that the 
United States was the last country to move from the first-to-invent to the first-to-file system). 
26 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
481, 495-96 (2011) (“Globalization entails increasingly numerous transnational interactions. More 
transnational interactions give rise to more transnational disputes. And plaintiffs purportedly 
bring a disproportionately large number of these disputes to U.S. courts because the American 
forum shopping system promises them access to favorable U.S. substantive and procedural laws.”); 
see also Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 163 (2003) (“Globalization and the greater ease of global communication 
have led courts to reexamine [jurisdictional] doctrine and, in several prominent recent cases, 
accept cases that previously might have been rejected as too remote to the interests of U.S. courts 
and the U.S. justice system.”). 
27 This could occur in two ways: (1) direct filing in federal district court on the basis of diver-
sity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing federal jurisdiction over suits 
between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”); id. § 1332(a)(3) (authorizing 
federal jurisdiction over suits between “citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects 
of a foreign state are additional parties”), or (2) removal by the defendant from state court, see id. 
§ 1441(a) (allowing removal to federal district court of any action over which the district court 
would have original jurisdiction). 
28 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (recognizing that foreign 
plaintiffs can usually bring their suits in a foreign forum and so forum non conveniens may be 
warranted to prevent an influx of foreign cases into U.S. courts). 
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juries and liability awards allowing both compensatory and punitive 
damages—unique to the U.S. court system.29 
After the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,30 foreign plaintiffs have even greater incentives to bring claims in state 
courts. The Court held that federal courts have no jurisdiction under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS)31 where the act underlying the dispute  
occurred outside of the United States.32 This effectively abrogated the lower 
courts’ more liberal grants of jurisdiction under the ATS.33 Although the 
decision leaves open the possibility that federal district courts will be able to 
hear disputes when the claims at issue sufficiently “touch and concern the 
territory of the United States,”34 this exception is very narrow.35 
Because the Supreme Court severely limited the circumstances in which 
federal courts have original jurisdiction under the ATS, commentators 
suggest that plaintiffs will have to bring these claims under international or 
state law, rather than under the ATS.36 This will lead to an increase in 
filings in state courts.37 Since a large portion of these disputes will involve 
an international party, it is likely that many will be removed to federal court 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.38 These considerations suggest that 
defendants will continue to use forum non conveniens as a tool for dismissal 
in federal court. 
 
29 See Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Policy: Time for Congressional 
Intervention?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 743, 743 (2012); see also Jena A. Sold, Comment, Inappropriate 
Forum or Inappropriate Law? A Choice-of-Law Solution to the Jurisdictional Standoff Between the United 
States and Latin America, 60 EMORY L.J. 1437, 1452 (2011) (“Many procedural and systemic 
advantages are, for the most part, unique to the American legal system. These include extensive 
pretrial discovery, conspicuously plaintiff-friendly juries, the contingency fee system, large damage 
awards, and relatively efficient disposition and enforcement of judgments.”). 
30 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
32 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
33 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATS 
grants federal jurisdiction for cases by aliens alleging violations of international rights), abrograted 
by Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
34 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
35 See id. (espousing a “presumption against extraterritorial application” even where the rele-
vant conduct touches and concerns the United States). 
36 See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 739 (2012) (“Perhaps we are about to witness a new wave of 
human-rights litigation not based on the ATS but based on state law or even foreign law.”). 
37 See id. (“[N]early all these battles in federal court concerning federal ATS claims will soon 
make their way to state- and foreign- law claims and, in some cases, to state courts, raising a host 
of interesting, new problems . . . .”). 
38 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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II. HOW REMOVAL POSES SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS DOCTRINE AND UNDERCUTS 
OTHER PROTECTIONS 
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Under Erie  
and the Problem Posed by Removal 
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the 
Supreme Court recognized that its rule in Swift v. Tyson—that federal 
courts hearing cases in diversity were free to fashion rules of federal  
common law39—was unconstitutional.40 According to the Court, the policy 
of federal jurisdiction required elimination of the Swift rule, which had 
resulted in unequal administration of the law and encouraged litigants to 
forum shop between state and federal courts.41 The Court instead adopted 
the view that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State.”42 Since Erie, the Court has struggled to adopt a coherent test for 
determining whether federal courts should apply federal or state law in 
diversity actions.43 
The Court has deliberately left unanswered the question whether, under 
its Erie jurisprudence, federal courts should apply state or federal forum non 
conveniens doctrine in diversity cases.44 Nevertheless, federal courts that 
 
39 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
40 Erie, 304 U.S. at  77-78. 
41 See id. at 74-76 (discussing how the Swift rule created negative incentives by leading to different 
outcomes in state and federal courts); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“The 
‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie 
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”). 
42 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
43 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25 (2010) (referring to the Court’s “confused jurisprudence 
that followed Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins”). For a summary of the different tests the Court has 
adopted since Erie, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (articulating a separate track of analysis when the 
situation is covered by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958) (adopting a balancing test between federal and state interests, 
wherein disruption of the state rule is permissible when there is a strong countervailing federal 
interest); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[I]n all cases where a federal court is 
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of 
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine 
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”). 
44 See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (refusing to resolve whether 
federal or state law controls because “Pennsylvania and California law on forum non conveniens 
dismissals are virtually identical to federal law”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 
(1947) (avoiding the Erie question by noting that New York and federal forum non conveniens 
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have reached the question have almost universally concluded that federal 
forum non conveniens governs.45 Their reasoning is suspect.46 There is 
 
standards were identical); Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 559 (1946) (“We 
reserve decision on th[e Erie] question. For even if we assume the New York rule to be applicable 
here, we would reach no different result.”). 
45 See, e.g., Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “a forum 
non conveniens motion in federal court is governed by federal law”); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. 
v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th Cir. 1993) (“‘The forum non conveniens doctrine is a rule 
of venue, not a rule of decision’ and, therefore, the Erie doctrine does not require the application of 
state forum non conveniens rules.” (quoting Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 
1985))); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis, Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 
50 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[S]tate forum non conveniens laws ‘ought not to be’ binding on federal courts in 
diversity cases.”); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 
1987) (en banc) (concluding that federal forum non conveniens applies in diversity cases because 
federal interests outweigh the need for uniformity), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032, prior opinion reinstated in relevant part, 883 F.2d 17 (5th 
Cir. 1989); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir.) (holding that the application of 
forum non conveniens did not “transgress Erie’s constitutional prohibition” because it “did not 
operate as a state substantive rule of law”), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985). But see Air Crash 
Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1180-83 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the 
interests favoring application of state law probably outweigh the federal forum’s interests in self-
administration, and that, under Erie, federal courts should thus apply state forum non conveniens); 
Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that state forum non conveniens law 
should govern in diversity cases to preserve Erie’s goal of uniformity). 
46 As Judge Higginbotham noted in his concurrence in Air Crash Disaster, applying federal 
forum non conveniens in diversity cases likely undermines the twin aims of Erie, at least where the 
federal and state standards differ markedly. 821 F.2d at 1182-83 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Federal courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s statement that “the doctrine [of 
forum non conveniens] is one of procedure rather than substance” in American Dredging Co. v. 
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994), to support their conclusion that federal doctrine governs. See, e.g., 
Rosa, 211 F.3d at 511-12 (“Our conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s statement in 
American Dredging . . . .”). However, the Court has long distanced itself from the unworkable, 
purely semantic distinction between law that is “procedural” and law that is “substantive.” See 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-66 (recognizing that although federal courts should apply state substantive 
law and federal procedural law under Erie, reference to the traditional distinction between 
substance and procedure is uninformative); Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109 (“[T]he question is not 
whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some sense. The question is 
whether such a statute . . . significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a federal court to 
disregard a law of a State . . . ?”). Further, most courts relied on Byrd in reaching this conclusion, 
pointing to the federal interest in regulating courts’ caseloads as more important than maintaining 
uniformity between federal and state courts. See, e.g., Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1159 (“We hold 
that the interests of the federal forum in self-regulation, in administrative independence, and in 
self-management are more important than the disruption of uniformity created by applying 
federal forum non conveniens in diversity cases.”). This reliance on Byrd seems misplaced, given that 
Byrd probably does not have much vitality after Hanna. See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the 
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1949 (2006) 
(“[T]he Court has not cited [Byrd] very often, and the thrust of its Erie jurisprudence since Byrd 
has been a repudiation of the balancing process Byrd seemed to authorize . . . .”). But see Catherine 
T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1231 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
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continuing debate as to whether the federal courts have reached the right 
result.47 
Whether or not it is correct to apply federal forum non conveniens law 
in diversity cases, it creates a special problem: defendants can use removal 
to have cases dismissed under federal forum non conveniens. Because 
federal courts apply federal law in these cases, defendants get the benefit of 
federal law, obtaining dismissal of cases that the state court would not have 
dismissed.48 This result is inconsistent with both the traditional justification 
for diversity jurisdiction—providing an unbiased forum for out-of-state 
defendants49—and the justification compellingly advanced by Edward 
Purcell—providing a forum for commercially important cases.50 Instead, 
under the current operation of the forum non conveniens doctrine, defendants 
can exploit the procedural tool of removal solely for the purpose of obtaining 
dismissal. 
This issue is implicated only if the forum non conveniens doctrines of 
the states differ from the federal standard, and probably only if there are 
 
never overruled Byrd); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1446 (2010) (“We are unaware of any rule to the effect that a holding of ours expires if the 
case setting it forth is not periodically revalidated.”). 
47 Compare Smith, supra note 29, at 745 (concluding that federal courts sitting in diversity 
should use the federal standard since forum non conveniens is procedural), with Laurel E. Miller, 
Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in 
International Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1392 (1991) (arguing that state interests and 
the important impact on international litigation are enough for federal courts to apply state forum 
non conveniens in diversity cases). 
48 See Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1219 (recognizing that federal forum non conveniens compelled 
dismissal even though the state standard would allow the case to be heard on the merits). 
49 See Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192, 198 (1894) (“The whole object of allowing a defendant 
to remove a suit or controversy into the Circuit Court of the United States is to prevent the 
plaintiff from obtaining any advantage against him by reason of prejudice or local influence.”); Ry. 
Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 289 (1871) (interpreting the purpose of diversity jurisdic-
tion as preventing unfairness in state court proceedings); Adam R. Prescott, Note, On Removal 
Jurisdiction’s Unanimous Consent Requirement, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 257-58 (2011) 
(detailing the history of removal as a tool to curtail unfair advantages gained by local plaintiffs in 
state courts). Some commentators question whether bias against out-of-state defendants still exists 
as a justification for retaining diversity jurisdiction, see, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 (1990), but 
practitioners continue to make arguments for the vitality of this rationale, see, e.g., Neal Miller, An 
Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 379 (1992) (noting that one of the reasons that attorneys argue for 
keeping diversity jurisdiction is that “the federal courts provide superior justice to that provided 
by state courts”). 
50 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 241 (1992) (accepting as the justifica-
tion for diversity jurisdiction the need “to recognize the dominant role of large corporations in the 
nation’s economy and to accord their activities the time and attention of the national courts”). 
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significant variations between the two standards. While most states have 
adopted the federal standard,51 a significant number use a different test and 
the Supreme Court has protected the right of states to formulate their own 
doctrine.52 At the time of writing, thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted either the federal forum non conveniens doctrine or 
something similar.53 However, even within this group, there are variations 
 
51 See infra note 53; see also Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens 
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 315 & nn.17-18 (2002) (finding that, at the time of writing, thirty 
states and the District of Columbia had adopted the federal forum non conveniens standard). For 
a table summarizing each state’s formulation of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Appendix. 
52 See Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (announcing that state 
courts “should be free[] to decide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in 
[FELA] suits according to [their] own local law”); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) 
(allowing states to fashion their own versions of forum non conveniens for application in 
appropriate cases); cf. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“The States thus 
have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.”); Chick Kam 
Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988) (“Federal forum non conveniens principles simply 
cannot determine whether [state] courts . . . would consider themselves an appropriate forum for 
petitioner’s lawsuit.”). 
53 The states that follow the federal standard are Alaska, see Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 
797, 800-01 (Alaska 1995); Arizona, see Parra v. Cont’l Tire N. Am., Inc., 213 P.3d 361, 364 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2009); Arkansas, see Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Gadbury-Swift, 362 
S.W.3d 291, 294-95 (Ark. 2010); California, see Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 18-21 (Cal. 
1991) (en banc); Connecticut, see Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 782 A.2d 103, 111-12 (Conn. 2001); the 
District of Columbia, see Blake v. Prof ’l Travel Corp., 768 A.2d 568, 572 (D.C. 2001); Florida, see 
Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1095 (Fla. 2013); Illinois, see Dawdy v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 693-96 (Ill. 2003); Indiana, see Anyango v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 971 
N.E.2d 654, 659-63 (Ind. 2012); Iowa, see In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 878-79 (Iowa 
1991); Kansas, see Volt Delta Res., Inc. v. Devine, 740 P.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Kan. 1987); Kentucky, see 
Lykins Enters., Inc. v. Felix, Nos. 06-142, 06-624, 2007 WL 4139637, at *4 (Ky. Nov. 21, 2007); 
Maine, see Corning v. Corning, 563 A.2d 379, 380 (Me. 1989); Maryland, see Johnson v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 552 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Md. 1989); Massachusetts, see New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. 
Estes, 228 N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (Mass. 1967); Michigan, see Radeljak v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 719 
N.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Mich. 2006); Minnesota, see Paulownia Plantations de Panama Corp. v. 
Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 2009); Mississippi, see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 728 So.2d 573, 575-76 (Miss. 1999); Missouri, see State ex rel. Wyeth v. Grady, 262 
S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. 2008) (en banc); Nebraska, see Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 694 
N.W.2d 191, 202 (Neb. 2005); Nevada, see Eaton v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 616 P.2d 400, 401 
(Nev. 1980) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. 
Cnty. of Clark, 88 P.3d 840 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam); New Hampshire, see Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 540 A.2d 1230, 1232 (N.H. 1988); New Jersey, see Kurzke v. Nissan Motor 
Corp. in U.S.A., 752 A.2d 708, 710-12 (N.J. 2000); New Mexico, see First Fin. Trust Co. v. Scott, 
929 P.2d 263, 264 (N.M. 1996); New York, see Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 
247-48 (N.Y. 1984); North Carolina, see Motor Inn Mgmt., Inc. v. Irvin-Fuller Dev. Co., 266 
S.E.2d 368, 371 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); North Dakota, see Vicknair v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 767 
N.W.2d 171, 176-78 (N.D. 2009); Ohio, see State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of Common 
Pleas, 832 N.E.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ohio 2005) (per curiam); Oklahoma, see Binder v. Shepard’s Inc., 
133 P.3d 276, 278-80 (Okla. 2006) (per curiam); Pennsylvania, see Rini v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 240 
A.2d 372, 373-74 (Pa. 1968); Rhode Island, see Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1182-85 
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on how the doctrine is applied, as some states place greater emphasis on 
certain factors.54 Three states have never explicitly adopted federal forum 
non conveniens standards, but have indicated a willingness to follow the 
federal standards.55 Another state has not yet adopted a specific formulation 
of the doctrine.56 Six states have adopted more limited versions of forum 
non conveniens,57 and two states preclude forum non conveniens dismissal 
 
(R.I. 2008); South Dakota, see Rothluebbers v. Obee, 668 N.W.2d 313, 317-18 (S.D. 2003); 
Tennessee, see Zurick v. Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Tenn. 1968); Texas, see Quixtar Inc. v. 
Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); Utah, see Energy 
Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp. Ltd., 325 P.3d 70, 77-78 (Utah 2014); Washington, see Sales v. 
Weyerhaeuser Co., 177 P.3d 1122, 1124-25 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); West Virginia, see Mace v. 
Mylan Pharm., Inc., 714 S.E.2d 223, 231-33 (W. Va. 2011); and Wisconsin, see Lau v. Chi. & N. 
W. Ry. Co., 111 N.W.2d 158, 162-63 (Wis. 1961). 
54 See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 18-21 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (holding that an 
unfavorable change in the law is not relevant when the alternative forum offers some remedy, 
unlike in Piper Aircraft, where an unfavorable change in law is always relevant but given substantial 
weight only when the alternative forum offers no remedy); Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 
1280-81 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (refusing to adopt Piper Aircraft’s presumption of less deference to 
a foreign plaintiff ’s choice of forum as unconvincing and unnecessary). 
55 These three states are Hawaii, see UFJ Bank Ltd. v. Ieda, 123 P.3d 1232, 1240 (Haw. 2005) 
(recognizing that the forum non conveniens inquiry requires an analysis of the availability of an 
alternative forum); Oregon, see Maricich v. Lacoss, 129 P.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“We 
assume, for purposes of this case, that the [federal] doctrine can be applied in Oregon courts.”); 
Novich v. McClean, 18 P.3d 424, 430 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (“Although Oregon has not, as of yet, 
adopted the Piper balancing test as the proper test to use in applying the inconvenient forum 
doctrine, we do not take issue with the trial court’s use of the test.”); and Virginia, see Va. Elec. & 
Power Co. v. Dungee, 520 S.E.2d 164, 170-71 (Va. 1999) (including the Gilbert factors in the “good 
cause” requirement for dismissal under forum non conveniens). 
56 Idaho has not yet promulgated a forum non conveniens standard because Idaho courts have 
failed to reach the question on procedural grounds. See, e.g., Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 625 P.2d 1098, 1102 (Idaho 1981) (“[F]orum non conveniens [dismissal] specifically requires a 
party to object before the court is required to review whether it will entertain a proceeding . . . .”); 
Marco Distrib., Inc. v. Biehl, 555 P.2d 393, 396-97 (Idaho 1976) (failing to reach the forum non 
conveniens question after holding that the trial court should have instead decided the motion to 
dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds). 
57 Alabama requires that defendants show the plaintiff ’s claims arose outside the state before 
analyzing whether a more appropriate alternative forum exists. See Malsch v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., 916 So. 2d 600, 602 (Ala. 2005) (“[A] defendant seeking dismissal of an action on 
the basis of forum non conveniens must show, first, that the plaintiff ’s claims arose outside of 
Alabama, and second, that an alternative forum exists.”). While Colorado has effectively eliminated 
forum non conveniens dismissals in cases brought by resident plaintiffs, see McDonnell–Douglas 
Corp. v. Lohn, 557 P.2d 373, 373-74 (Colo. 1976) (en banc) (holding that the Colorado constitution 
“limits very stringently the power to exclude resident plaintiffs from [the] court system where 
jurisdiction has otherwise been properly established” and that the “doctrine of forum non conveniens 
has only the most limited application in Colorado courts, and except in most unusual circumstances 
the choice of a Colorado forum by a resident plaintiff will not be disturbed”), South Carolina has 
expressly ruled that this is an inappropriate basis for a dismissal under forum non conveniens, see 
Chapman v. S. Ry. Co., 95 S.E.2d 170, 173 (S.C. 1956) (“[Forum non conveniens] should not be 
applied in this case when the plaintiff is a resident of South Carolina.”). Delaware requires 
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except in a narrow range of cases.58 Finally, one state has questioned whether 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens is generally applicable in that state.59 
Because many states have adopted versions of forum non conveniens that 
differ significantly from the federal doctrine and states can continue to 
modify their rules, this problem deserves attention. 
 
defendants to show that they have met a range of factors similar to the federal factors and to 
demonstrate with particularity that there is an “overwhelming hardship.” Martinez v. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 86 A.3d 1102, 1104 (Del. 2014); see also Chrysler First Bus. Credit Corp. v. 1500 
Locust Ltd. P’ship, 669 A.2d 104, 105 (Del. 1995) (“The trial court must consider the weight of 
those factors in the particular case and determine whether any or all of them truly cause both 
inconvenience and hardship.”). Vermont has emphasized that application of forum non conveniens 
“is by far the exception, not the rule” and that “its cardinal purpose is to prevent the plaintiff from 
seeking to vex, harass, or oppress the defendant by inflicting upon him [unnecessary] expenses.” 
Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 510 (Vt. 1976). Wyoming precludes dismissal as long 
as the suit is “based . . . on rational grounds” and “not brought for purposes of harassment.” 
W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991). 
58 Louisiana allows forum non conveniens arguments only for federal causes of action and 
specifically eliminated the doctrine’s application in cases brought under the Jones Act or federal 
maritime law. See Miller v. Am. Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 617 (La. 1992) (“A clear reading of 
article 123(C) leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is specifically 
made unavailable in a Jones Act or maritime law case.”), aff ’d, 510 U.S. 443 (1994); cf. LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 123 (1989) (stating that forum non conveniens dismissals are confined to 
cases “in which a claim or cause of action is predicated solely upon a federal statute” and not 
“brought pursuant to [the Jones Act] or federal maritime law”). Louisiana has also restricted the 
factors that its courts can consider in a forum non conveniens analysis. See Holland v. Lincoln 
Gen. Hosp., 48 So. 3d 1050, 1054-55 (La. 2010) (noting that the Louisiana Code limits the factors 
that courts may consider in a forum non conveniens analysis to the “convenience of the parties and 
the witnesses” and “the interest of justice”). Georgia has permitted forum non conveniens only 
when authorized by statute and in the very limited circumstance where nonresidents bring suit for 
injuries that occurred outside the United States. See Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 527, 
528-29 (Ga. 2005) (holding that Georgia’s forum non conveniens rule “is not authority for 
dismissing a suit by a nonresident alien based on injuries suffered in this country”); AT & T Corp. 
v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2001) (“Relying on our inherent judicial power, we adopt the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens for use in lawsuits brought in our state courts by nonresident 
aliens who suffer injuries outside this country.”); Holtsclaw v. Holtsclaw, 496 S.E.2d 262, 263 (Ga. 
1998) (recognizing that the forum non conveniens doctrine is “generally controlled by statutory 
provisions” and applies to cases under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). 
59 Montana does not allow forum non conveniens in FELA cases, see Rule v. Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 106 P.3d 533, 536 (Mont. 2005), and has not yet decided whether the doctrine 
has general applicability, see State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498 
(Mont. 1995) (explaining that the court has “neither accepted nor rejected the application of forum 
non conveniens in non-FELA cases and . . . ha[s] neither denied nor recognized the existence of 
that doctrine in cases where there is no strong policy favoring plaintiff ’s forum selection”). 
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B. How Applying Federal Forum Non Conveniens in Diversity Cases  
Undercuts Other Protections 
Although the federal courts’ use of federal forum non conveniens law in 
diversity cases may not pose any problems in the abstract, especially if one 
agrees with the courts’ Erie analyses, the doctrine’s application is problematic 
because it threatens to undercut a range of protections. Most important, it 
tends to undermine the equitable purpose of the doctrine. However, it has 
further effects beyond the doctrine itself, subverting the interests of both the 
parties and the states. 
1. Equitable Nature of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
As described above, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has developed 
as an equitable tool to dismiss a case only when it is inconvenient to try the 
case in the forum where it was originally filed.60 District courts may dismiss 
cases after examining the factors weighing both for and against dismissal, 
and their rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.61 And although courts 
are directed to consider some factors related to the court’s interests in each 
case,62 most of the factors are directed to the interests of the parties in the 
suit.63 
Applying a different standard in federal court on removal weakens one 
of the main factors that courts consider in the forum non conveniens 
balancing test: the availability of an alternative forum. As the Supreme 
Court has directed, the first step of the analysis should be to determine 
 
60 See supra Section I.A; see also Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) 
(“Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court to 
decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the 
action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.”); Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, 
Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a Response from the United States Government, 25 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1991) (“Forum non conveniens is an equitable, common-law 
doctrine reflecting the concept that litigation ought to be conducted in a reasonably ‘convenient’ or 
appropriate tribunal.”); John W. Joyce, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 293, 317 (1999) (concluding that forum non conveniens is an important tool whose main 
purpose is to “eliminate suits with little or no connection to the forum state”). 
61 See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens determination 
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court [and] may be reversed only when there has been 
a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
62 Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (cataloging the public factors relevant 
to the forum non conveniens analysis, including administrative burden on the court and complexity 
of the conflict of laws). 
63 See id. at 508 (“An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the 
private interest of the litigant.”). 
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whether there exists another adequate forum.64 Although the bar for 
availability of an adequate alternative forum is low,65 it is an important 
factor that can be dispositive.66 In some cases, a state court might be an 
alternative forum;67 hence, a federal court may consider whether the state 
court is both available and adequate. But if the defendant brought the case 
to federal court by way of removal and the federal court dismissed for forum 
non conveniens, the plaintiff would never be able to pursue the action in 
state court because, presumably, the defendant could always remove to 
federal court.68 In this situation, even though there is an adequate alterna-
tive forum (i.e., the state court), the plaintiff can never gain access to it. In 
fact, this situation may explain why many federal courts will not entertain a 
forum non conveniens argument where the alternative forum is in the same 
state as the federal forum.69 It seems particularly problematic that a federal 
 
64 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, 
the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507 
(noting that the forum non conveniens doctrine “presupposes at least two forums in which the 
defendant is amenable to process”). 
65 The Supreme Court has held that even an unfavorable change of the law does not warrant 
dismissal, Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249, unless the remedy is “so clearly inadequate or unsatisfac-
tory that it is no remedy at all,” id. at 254. 
66 See, e.g., Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l (Overseas) Ltd. v. State Bank of Pak., 273 F.3d 
241, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing and remanding a forum non conveniens dismissal where the 
district court relied on the availability of an adequate alternative forum on the basis of a law in 
that forum that was modified after the district court’s decision); Vandam v. Smit, 148 A.2d 289, 291 
(N.H. 1959) (“Where, as in this case, the record discloses only a forum in New Hampshire, the 
Court was correct in denying the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a matter of 
law.”). But see Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 250 (N.Y. 1984) (allowing a 
district court to reject jurisdiction even in the absence of a suitable alternative forum). 
67 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the possibility that a state court may in some 
instances be the most convenient forum. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 
549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007). 
68 There is no practical barrier to block the plaintiff from refiling his action in state court. 
The defendant likely could not obtain an injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (2012), because the presumption against federal court enjoinment of state proceedings holds 
when an action is dismissed under forum non conveniens in federal court, then subsequently 
refiled in state court. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149 (1988) (“[A] federal 
court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of § 2283 and to enjoin state court 
proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade an 
area pre-empted by federal law . . . .”). Nevertheless, after the plaintiff refiles, the defendant can 
remove the case to federal court and obtain dismissal. 
69 See, e.g., Park v. Didden, 695 F.2d 626, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reversing the lower court’s 
finding that a case can be dismissed where the alternative forum is in the same place as the 
selected forum); Wade v. Ilisagvik Coll., No. A05-86, 2005 WL 2340710, at *4 (D. Alaska Sept. 20, 
2005) (finding that forum non conveniens applies only in cases where the alternative forum is 
abroad); Rogge v. Menard Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D. Ill. 1960) (“The 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable here for the reason that the State court is located 
at Petersburg, Illinois, approximately 25 miles from Springfield, in which city is located the 
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court can dismiss a case and force the plaintiff to initiate the action in a 
foreign court when there is a U.S. court willing to adjudicate the dispute. 
Using federal forum non conveniens law in diversity cases also  
undermines the underlying equitable purpose of the doctrine. In deciding 
whether to remove to federal court, defendants can now calculate the 
probability of obtaining dismissal under the federal standard, and compare 
it with the probability of dismissal under the state standard. This shifts the 
focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry toward strategic legal argument 
and away from thorough examination of the hardships accruing to the 
defendant and the forum.70 By empowering the defendant to choose the 
forum, the federal courts erode two other important facets of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine: (1) the law’s presumption that the plaintiff ’s forum is 
convenient, and (2) the defendant’s burden to upset that presumption by 
demonstrating unfairness.71 These inequities have become even more 
pronounced because courts have formulated the doctrine liberally to broaden 
judicial discretion, and then used this discretion extensively to dismiss 
cases.72 
The counterargument that extensive dismissal under forum non conveniens 
is compelled by Erie and its progeny is unavailing. As the Court noted in 
Hanna v. Plumer, the outcome-determination test must always be viewed in 
light of the twin aims of Erie: preventing forum shopping and ensuring 
 
courthouse for this court.”). But see Kettenbach v. Demoulas, 822 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D. Mass. 1993) 
(concluding that the same principles govern the forum non conveniens inquiry where the 
alternative forum is a state court rather than a foreign court). 
70 The Supreme Court has suggested that the core focus of a forum non conveniens inquiry 
is a thorough analysis of the convenience to the parties involved in the dispute. See Piper Aircraft, 
454 U.S. at 249. Mere strategy to choose a favorable forum is not a cause for dismissal, see Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947), so the doctrine should not shift to encompass it. 
71 A plaintiff ’s choice of forum is generally entitled to deference, see Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 
(“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff ’s choice of forum should 
rarely be disturbed.”), and the defendant has a heavy burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff ’s 
choice of forum is “unnecessarily burdensome,” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 n.19. Deference to 
the plaintiff ’s choice of forum and the burden imposed on the defendant are both devalued when 
defendants can use removal to effectuate a different standard and more easily obtain dismissal. 
72 See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal 
Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 940 (1990) 
(arguing that the federal courts’ aggressive use of dismissal under forum non conveniens has led 
plaintiffs to file transnational personal injury cases in state courts); Whytock, supra note 26, at 502-
04 (finding higher dismissal rates of transnational claims on forum non conveniens grounds since 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 
549 U.S. 422 (2007)); Christopher Speer, Comment, The Continued Use of Forum Non Conveniens: 
Is It Justified?, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 845, 859 (1993) (“[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
often outcome-determinative. Therefore, the shift in the forum non conveniens application from 
the restrictive ‘abuse of process version’ to the more liberal ‘most suitable forum version’ seriously 
impairs a plaintiff ’s chance of recovery.” (footnote omitted)). 
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equitable administration of the laws.73 The federal courts’ analysis of forum 
non conveniens implicates both of these concerns. 
First, it encourages forum shopping, at least by defendants. Although 
the Court in Erie was primarily concerned with vertical forum shopping by 
plaintiffs,74 the doctrine broadly prohibits using the accident of diversity as 
an excuse to obtain a favorable change in the law.75 And this is exactly what 
defendants are doing: they are leveraging removal to escape state court 
jurisdiction by opening the possibility of dismissal under the federal 
doctrine. Removal of a case to federal court will always result in the change 
of the procedural law applied in the case under Erie,76 but the purpose of the 
removal statute is only to provide an unbiased forum where the case can be 
heard.77 Removal should not have so great an effect on the outcome of the 
case that defendants can use it solely for the purpose of getting the case 
dismissed under federal forum non conveniens.78 The transfer statute was 
adopted to explicitly address these forum-shopping concerns, and applying 
federal forum non conveniens in diversity cases undercuts these protections.79 
Second, the federal courts’ rule treats similarly situated defendants 
differently. Based solely on his citizenship, the diverse defendant secures an 
opportunity unavailable to the nondiverse (or in-state) defendant: removing 
the case and arguing dismissal under federal forum non conveniens. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, it produces inherent unfairness.80  
Defendants should not be able to exploit removal as a tool to obtain dismissal. 
 
73 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
74 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (criticizing the Swift v. Tyson rule  
because it allowed nonresident plaintiffs to obtain a favorable change in the law by choosing 
whether to file the case in state or federal court). But see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS 
AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 141-91 (2000) (suggesting 
that the Erie decision was masking Justice Brandeis’s real concern about removal by corporate 
defendants). 
75 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The nub of the policy that underlies 
[Erie] is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal 
court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result.”); 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (declaring that federal courts must 
apply state conflict-of-laws rules to avoid unequal administration of the laws when a nonresident is 
a party). 
76 See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2374 n.2 (2011) (“[F]ederal procedural rules 
govern a case that has been removed to federal court.” (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010))). 
77 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
78 A contrary result would seem to undermine the outcome-determination test established by 
the Court in York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
79 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
80 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, federal courts should not be able to require plaintiffs to refile 
cases in foreign courts when a state court is willing to hear the case. This is 
especially true where the policy in the federal courts has shifted away from 
dismissing cases and toward transferring cases to a convenient forum.81 
2. Transfer of Law Under § 1404(a) 
Section 1404(a) allows a district court to transfer an inconvenient case to 
any other district court where venue is proper.82 Nevertheless, in Van Dusen 
v. Barrack, the Supreme Court—citing the policy underlying the statute—
decided that the law to be applied in the original forum is transferred with 
the case.83 The Court sought to maintain the relationship between the federal 
court sitting in diversity and the state court,84 and to prevent defendants 
from using transfer as an opportunity to secure more favorable law.85 
An overbroad reading of Van Dusen might suggest that the Supreme Court 
wanted the law originally associated with a case to track the case. A better 
reading is that the Supreme Court was signaling a fear that defendants could 
use procedural levers to gain unfair advantages.86 This is a more persuasive 
interpretation of the statute, since the legislative history suggests that 
 
81 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (“The harshest result of the application 
of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision 
in § 1404(a) for transfer.”). 
82 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (“[T]he 
purpose of [§ 1404(a)] is to prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect litigants, 
witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . . .’” (quoting Cont’l 
Grain Co. v. The Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 (1960))). 
83 See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639 (“We conclude, therefore, that in cases . . . where the  
defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that 
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue.”). 
84 See id. (“[T]he critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which 
decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was filed.”). 
85 See id. at 638 (“[W]e should ensure that the ‘accident’ of federal diversity jurisdiction does 
not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have 
been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed.”); see also id. at 633-34 (“There 
is nothing, however, in the language or policy of § 1404(a) to justify its use by defendants to defeat 
the advantages accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although it was inconven-
ient, was a proper venue.”). 
86 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (“The Court [in Van Dusen] 
feared that if a change in venue were accompanied by a change in law, forum-shopping parties 
would take unfair advantage of the relaxed standards for transfer.”); cf. Levy v. Pyramid Co. of 
Ithaca, 687 F. Supp. 48, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The underlying rationale for th[e Van Dusen] 
decision was that defendants might transform section 1404 into a forum shopping device, 
obtaining a ‘change of law as a bonus for a change of venue.’”), aff ’d, 871 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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§ 1404(a) was never intended to be used by parties to engage in forum 
shopping.87 
The Court’s underlying reasoning applies with equal force to the analysis 
of forum non conveniens. Federal courts cannot remedy this problem by 
using § 1404(a) to remand or transfer cases to state court.88 But they can 
embrace the reasoning of the Van Dusen Court by avoiding rules that 
encourage defendants to remove solely for the purpose of having a case 
dismissed. Treating forum non conveniens and transfer differently makes it 
difficult to reconcile the underlying rationales in the Piper Aircraft and Van 
Dusen decisions because defendants can circumvent the protections in Van 
Dusen by getting the case dismissed under the Piper Aircraft formulation of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
There may be good reasons for the standards in Piper Aircraft and Van 
Dusen to be incongruent. The doctrines of transfer and forum non conveniens 
are directed toward answering two different questions,89 and appellate courts 
are directed to give district courts greater latitude under § 1404(a).90 Neverthe-
less, the analysis under either doctrine is practically identical.91 Section 1404(a) 
was intended to supplement forum non conveniens—not replace it—by 
favoring transfer over dismissal.92 And the Supreme Court’s most recent 
 
87 See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635-36 (interpreting the legislative history and purposes of 
§ 1404(a) to suggest that the section was intended only as a “federal judicial housekeeping 
measure” and was not meant to encourage forum shopping); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 
U.S. 516, 527 (1990) (expressing the need to construe § 1404(a) so that neither party obtains a 
favorable change in the law by way of transfer). 
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (permitting transfer only from one district court to another); 
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 (“[Section 1404(a)] was designed as a ‘federal housekeeping measure,’ 
allowing easy change of venue within a unified federal system.”). 
89 Compare Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955) (“It is perfectly clear that the 
purpose of [§ 1404(a)] was to grant broadly the power of transfer for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice, whether dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
would have been appropriate or not.” (quoting Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart–Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 
360, 362 (4th Cir. 1949))), with id. at 31 (“[Forum non conveniens] involves the dismissal of a case 
because the forum chosen by the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and inconvenient that it is 
better to stop the litigation in the place where brought and let it start all over again somewhere else.” 
(quoting All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952))). 
90 See id. at 32 (construing § 1404 “to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing 
of inconvenience” than is needed for a dismissal under forum non conveniens). 
91 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013) (“[B]oth 
§ 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the same balancing-of-
interests standard . . . .”); Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 (suggesting that courts should analyze the same 
factors for both transfer and forum non conveniens but that transfer requires a “lesser showing of 
inconvenience”). 
92 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 (“Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal 
court system; in such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal 
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discussion of the two doctrines treats them as functionally equivalent.93 The 
best interpretation is to harmonize these cases to preserve the protections 
afforded to litigants under both doctrines. 
3. Interests of the States 
In addition to threatening the interests of the parties, using federal  
forum non conveniens in diversity cases affects the interests of the states. 
States have the power to formulate the jurisdictional requirements of their 
own court systems.94 Although states cannot use this authority to block 
litigants from bringing federal claims in state court, they have broad 
discretion to control the type and number of cases that their courts will 
hear.95 Therefore, they can formulate the forum non conveniens doctrine to 
accomplish any purpose they deem fit.96 The federal courts’ application of 
federal forum non conveniens law in diversity cases diminishes this power. 
Because federal courts apply different forum non conveniens standards, they 
can dismiss cases that a state court is willing to hear. 
Moreover, the federal courts can exert influence over a state’s choice of 
its forum non conveniens standard. This is best illustrated by example. In 
1978, Florida adopted the rule that a case could not be  
dismissed for forum non conveniens where either of the parties to the suit 
was a Florida resident.97 The court reasoned that Florida had a “fundamental 
interest in resolving controversies involving its citizens,” such that providing 
 
with transfer.”); Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 (“The harshest result of the application of the old 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in 
§ 1404(a) for transfer.”). 
93 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580. 
94 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1935) (“A State may adopt such system of 
courts and form of remedy as it sees fit.”); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) 
(espousing the rule that states have broad authority to legislate to control their own jurisdictions). 
95 See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (“The power of a State to 
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall 
be heard in them is, of course, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution.”). 
96 In fact, states were engaging in this practice long before the Supreme Court approved the 
use of forum non conveniens in the federal courts. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 
450 (1994) (recognizing that forum non conveniens was adopted by the states before its formal 
recognition in the federal courts); Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 908, 911-12 (1947) (finding evidence that the states had been using forum non conveniens at 
least as far back as 1929). 
97 Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Swain, 362 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1978) (“[A] case may be 
dismissed from the Florida courts in favor of a more convenient forum in another state only where 
none of the parties involved in the suit are residents of this state.”); Houston v. Caldwell, 359 So. 
2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1978) (“[W]e hold that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable to 
any suit properly filed in this state where either party is a resident of Florida.”), abrogated by 
Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996). 
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a forum for its citizens’ disputes was more important than furthering the 
convenience of the parties.98 
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
held that it was proper for district courts to apply federal forum non 
conveniens law in diversity cases.99 Since defendants who are citizens of the 
state in which they are being sued cannot remove to federal court,100 this 
created problems for the Florida standard. The Florida courts recognized 
that their standard—adopted for the purpose of settling Florida disputes—
was systematically disadvantaging Florida defendants.101 Unlike  
nonresident defendants who had the opportunity to remove and argue 
dismissal under the federal version of forum non conveniens, resident 
defendants could not raise a forum non conveniens argument.102 In other 
words, because “Florida [was] appl[ying] a less vigorous doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, the state actually [was] disadvantaging some of its own 
residents.”103 For this reason and because of other negative results created by 
the state standard,104 the Florida Supreme Court felt compelled to adopt the 
federal standard of forum non conveniens.105 Florida has continued to 
develop its forum non conveniens doctrine to more closely mirror the 
federal standard.106 
This case demonstrates the undue influence that the federal courts may 
exert—although indirectly—on a state’s determination of its jurisdictional 
rules. Such a result cannot be squared with the states’ broad power to 
control the jurisdiction of their own courts.107 Considering this problem in 
conjunction with the other inequities resulting from defendants using 
removal for the purpose of having a case dismissed under forum non 
 
98 Houston, 359 So. 2d at 861. 
99 Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985). 
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012). 
101 See Kinney Sys., 674 So. 2d at 88 (“A Florida lawsuit filed against a non-Florida defendant 
sometimes can be mandatorily removed to federal court and there dismissed based on the federal 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, as happened in Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co. However, when a 
defendant is a Florida resident, removal may not be permitted.” (citation omitted)), holding 
modified on other grounds by Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085 (Fla. 2013). 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 The court was also concerned about “additional burdens imposed upon Florida’s trial 
courts over and above those caused by disputes with substantial connections to state interests.” Id. 
105 See id. at 93 (“[W]e are persuaded that the time has come for Florida to adopt the federal 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.”). 
106 Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1095 (Fla. 2013) (clarifying that the Florida 
forum non conveniens rule, like the federal rule, affords less deference to the plaintiff ’s choice of 
forum only where the plaintiff is a non-U.S. resident). 
107 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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conveniens,108 the courts—and ultimately Congress—must take action to 
prevent defendants from engaging in this practice. 
III. THE PROPOSED REMEDY 
A. Waiver as a Workable Solution 
The easiest—and most practical—way to prevent defendants from  
engaging in this behavior is for courts to require defendants to forfeit the 
forum non conveniens argument when they remove to federal court. This 
remedy should be limited to those cases where the state forum non conveniens 
doctrine would not dismiss. This would directly cut off defendants’ unjust 
use of forum non conveniens to disadvantage plaintiffs. 
Courts have adopted waiver in a range of situations to promote judicial 
efficiency and fairness.109 Adopting waiver in this context will make 
defendants use removal in a way more consistent with its intended purpose. 
Defendants are not required to remove diversity cases110 to federal court, 
but instead can elect whether removal would be advantageous.111 Because 
removal is voluntary, courts are more willing to find that defendants who 
remove have consented to the jurisdiction of the federal court.112 This is 
consistent with the accepted purpose of diversity jurisdiction, namely, 
providing an unbiased forum to adjudicate the dispute.113 If defendants are 
 
108 See supra subsections II.B.1-2. 
109 See, e.g., Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[Waiver] applies when a party attempts to raise a new issue in its reply brief, because an 
issue advanced only in reply provides the appellee no opportunity to meet the contention.” (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 833 
F.2d 1253, 1261 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting waiver when a party raises an argument for the first time on 
appeal because trial judges should not be “obligated to conduct a search for other issues”). 
110 Under § 1441, defendants can also remove cases where the case involves a federal question. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (holding that 
defendants can remove cases where federal question jurisdiction lies because they originally could 
have been filed in the federal court). However, that type of case is not implicated by this 
Comment because it would not be subject to Erie analysis. 
111 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
112 See, e.g., Sayles v. Nw. Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 608, 608 (Curtis, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.R.I. 
1854) (No. 12,421) (finding that, by removing, a defendant “waive[s] any personal privilege he 
might have had to be sued in another [court]” and upholding jurisdiction against the defendant’s 
challenge, even though the case could not have been originally maintained in the federal court to 
which it was removed). 
113 Courts have continually stated that the purpose of allowing defendants to remove when 
there is complete diversity of citizenship is “to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining any advantage 
against him by reason of prejudice or local influence.” Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192, 198 (1894); 
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removing cases to federal court solely for the purpose of obtaining an 
unbiased forum, there is no injustice in forcing them to waive arguments to 
forum non conveniens, especially where the choice to remove is voluntary. 
Although the courts will take away a tool that defendants use periodically to 
effectuate dismissal of cases, adopting waiver is not unfair because there was 
never any intention for defendants to use removal for this purpose. Instead, 
once this rule is established, defendants can include it in their calculus when 
determining whether or not it is advantageous to remove. 
Courts have adopted waiver-by-removal in other similar cases. For  
example, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state waives its Eleventh 
Amendment argument to sovereign immunity when it removes to federal 
court.114 The Court reasoned that by removing, a state “voluntarily invoke[s] 
the federal court’s jurisdiction” and waives any argument that it could not be 
sued in federal court.115 The policy underlying the decision in Lapides was 
motivated by a fear that without waiver-by-removal, states would be able to 
exploit procedural rules to obtain unfair advantages.116 
When a defendant removes for the purpose of invoking federal forum 
non conveniens doctrine, the same injustice occurs. Although the sovereign 
immunity cases rely primarily on the well-settled notion that voluntary 
actions by the State waive immunity,117 the policy concerns address the 
inherent unfairness of allowing defendants to use removal as a tool to obtain 
strategic advantages in a case. In drafting the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA),118 Congress specifically excluded class actions brought against 
states from the statute’s purview in order to prevent states from exploiting 
removal solely to argue sovereign immunity in the federal courts.119 Because 
 
see also Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 289 (1871) (interpreting the purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction as preventing unfairness in state court proceedings). 
114 Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002). 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 621 (expressing the concern that adopting the State’s Eleventh Amendment 
position would allow “unfair tactical advantages” and make jurisdictional rules too unclear). 
117 See Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a State volun-
tarily becomes a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound 
thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the 
Eleventh Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
118 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
119 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (2012) (stating that the CAFA jurisdictional provisions do 
not apply to actions where “the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental 
entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief”); S. REP. NO. 
109-14, at 42 (2005) (“The purpose of the ‘state action’ cases provision is to prevent states, state 
officials, or other governmental entities from dodging legitimate claims by removing class actions 
to federal court and then arguing that the federal courts are constitutionally prohibited from 
granting the requested relief.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in 
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1453-54 (2008) (“It is apparent 
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a defendant’s use of removal to argue dismissal under federal forum non 
conveniens implicates the same policy concerns,120 courts should import the 
concept of waiver. 
Federal courts may be adverse to adopting waiver as the solution to this 
problem. Adopting waiver in this context would completely eliminate a 
judge’s ability to evaluate the convenience factors in a subset of cases—albeit a 
small subset—which would undercut the discretion and flexibility traditionally 
afforded to federal judges to dismiss cases that have no connection to the 
forum.121 Courts may also have an institutional self-interest in preserving the 
right to dismiss these cases to avoid potential problems, such as inaccuracy 
and inefficiency in adjudication.122 
These are valid concerns, but they underestimate the need for and narrow 
scope of the remedy. It is necessary for courts to curtail defendants’ abusive 
use of procedural tools to disadvantage plaintiffs. The remedy is narrowly 
tailored to apply only in cases where this abuse is actually occurring: when 
the state would not dismiss under its own formulation of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine.123 A defendant who chooses not to remove will not be 
able to obtain a dismissal in federal court. And although there are incentives 
to file in U.S. courts,124 the remedy of waiver is further limited because it 
would be available only in cases where forum non conveniens arguments are 
appropriate125 that were originally filed in state court and then removed to 
federal court. 
Without either additional consideration of the concerns highlighted above 
or explicit guidance from Congress, courts may be unwilling to implement 
the solution of waiver-by-removal. Courts have limited the applicability of 
 
that . . . [§ 1332(d)(5)(A)] acknowledges the unfairness of permitting state officials to remove 
cases, only to plead the bar of sovereign immunity.”). 
120 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
121 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (highlighting the discretionary 
nature of the forum non conveniens inquiry and the broad authority conferred to district court 
judges); see also id. at 249-50 (“If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.”). 
122 Cf. id. at 251 (recognizing that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is formulated in part 
to “avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law”). 
123 Where the state standard would have dismissed the case anyway, there is no inequity. 
Hence, these cases will arise only where the state has no forum non conveniens doctrine or one 
less robust than the federal doctrine.  
124 See supra note 29. 
125 These cases will be restricted to those that involve either foreign parties or events that 
occurred abroad. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (suggesting that 
forum non conveniens applies only in cases where the alternative forum is a foreign court). 
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waiver in other contexts to ensure the equity of the remedy.126 Hence, 
Congress should ultimately legislate in this area to solve this problem.  
B. Amendment of the Removal Statute as the Preferred Solution 
Congress has a range of legislative options to address this problem. For 
example, Congress could adopt a statute that requires federal courts sitting 
in diversity to apply state forum non conveniens law.127 Although this 
statute would probably be workable, it is not ideal because it would require 
most of the federal courts to reverse course on a settled practice.128 
A better option is for Congress to codify the requirement that defendants 
waive their argument for a forum non conveniens dismissal upon removal if 
the state standard would not warrant dismissal. This amendment would 
essentially mirror the sovereign immunity carve-out in CAFA by selecting a 
class of cases in which defendants waive arguments when they remove a case 
to federal court.129 Just as the CAFA sovereign immunity exception exists to 
prevent the inequity of defendants removing solely for the purpose of getting 
the case dismissed,130 this same carve-out should be recognized for the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to prevent the unfairness that results from 
the same maneuver. At least one notable civil procedure scholar has already 
recognized that this would be a viable option.131 
 
126 See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (recognizing an exception to the 
general rule of waiver when the issue was not ruled on in a lower court “where the proper 
resolution is beyond any doubt or where ‘injustice might otherwise result’” (citations omitted)); 
Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing courts to consider 
new factual allegations on appeal when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as long as they are 
consistent with the complaint). 
127 Under the Hanna v. Plumer analysis, the federal statute would govern the controversy and 
could be struck down only if it violated Congress’s authority under the Constitution. See 380 U.S. 
460, 471-72 (1965). 
128 The problem identified in this Comment stems directly from the federal courts’ treatment 
of forum non conveniens under Erie. The proposed statute would have the benefit of addressing 
the identified unfairness without requiring the Supreme Court to decide whether the federal 
courts have reached the right result under Erie. However, because almost all of the circuits have 
concluded that federal forum non conveniens law applies in diversity cases, see supra note 45, it 
may be unwise to require so many federal courts to change their practices. 
129 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
130 See Burbank, supra note 119, at 1453-54 (discerning that the sovereign immunity exception 
in CAFA operates to prevent the injustice of states using removal to obtain unfair advantages). 
131 See id. at 1454 n.52 (arguing that “[t]he federal courts could learn a valuable lesson from 
[the CAFA sovereign immunity exception] in their administration of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine in diversity cases” because it is unfair that “state courts that do not have any [forum non 
conveniens] doctrine, or that follow a version that is less robust, be deprived of the power to hear a 
case” when the removing party makes that argument for dismissal). 
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However, the best option is to amend the removal statute132 to require 
federal courts to remand, rather than dismiss, removed cases to the state 
court after concluding that a case is inconvenient under federal forum non 
conveniens. Adopting remand in this context would directly address the 
problem identified in this Comment. Instead of dismissing cases deemed 
inconvenient under federal law, federal courts would send the cases back to 
the state court for an independent forum non conveniens analysis. This 
would keep intact the federal courts’ current practice of applying federal 
forum non conveniens in diversity cases. Nevertheless, remand would allow 
states to apply their own forum non conveniens doctrine and thus retain 
jurisdiction when their forum non conveniens law does not compel dismis-
sal. This amendment would allow both state and federal courts to continue 
to operate exactly as they do now, while permitting states to hear cases that 
they deem important and preventing defendants from exploiting procedural 
rules to disadvantage plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Stare decisis requires that courts follow the rules established in previous 
cases.133 But it does not create a straightjacket that binds courts forever. 
Judges are free to reevaluate old rules and revise them when they are 
outdated or unworkable.134 
This is the case with the federal courts’ Erie analysis of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. Federal courts have almost universally held that federal 
forum non conveniens law applies in diversity cases.135 Hence, defendants 
can obtain a change in forum non conveniens law by removing from state 
 
132 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). 
133 See Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The  
essence of stare decisis is that the mere existence of certain decisions becomes a reason for 
adhering to their holdings in subsequent cases.”); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing stare decisis as the creation of binding legal precedent on future cases 
before the same court or a lower court); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 
939 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior 
jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction.”). Obviously, 
the Supreme Court is not constrained by this policy. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 
(1991) (recognizing that, although it is good policy, the Court is not required to follow prior 
decisions). 
134 See Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] decision may properly 
be overruled if seriously out of keeping with contemporary views or passed by in the development 
of the law or proved to be unworkable . . . .” (quoting EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1986))); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[Courts are] not absolutely 
bound by [their previous decisions], and must give fair consideration to any substantial argument 
that a litigant makes for overruling a previous decision.”). 
135 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
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courts. This provides an incentive for defendants to exploit the removal 
process, bringing the case to federal court solely for the purpose of having it 
dismissed under forum non conveniens. 
This has a particularly unfair effect in cases where the state has no forum 
non conveniens doctrine or a forum non conveniens doctrine that is less 
robust than the federal standard.136 Even though the state court would have 
allowed the case to proceed, defendants can now secure dismissal in the 
federal court. This practice has further effects beyond the scope of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine itself, diminishing both parties’ and states’ 
interests. These concerns have not been adequately considered by courts in 
determining how forum non conveniens should be analyzed under the Erie 
doctrine. 
To eliminate these inequities, I propose that federal courts adopt a rule 
that defendants waive their arguments to forum non conveniens in the federal 
court when they remove from a state where the case would not be dismissed 
under the state forum non conveniens doctrine. If courts will not endorse this 
rule, then Congress should codify it in the removal statute or require remand 
to the state courts for an independent forum non conveniens determination 
whenever federal forum non conveniens authorizes dismissal. 
 
 
136 See Burbank, supra note 119, at 1454 & n.52. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: State Formulations of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
 
State Description 
States Following Standard Similar or Identical to Federal Forum Non Conveniens  
(37 & D.C.) 
Alaska137  
Arizona138  
Arkansas139  
California140  
Connecticut141  
D.C.142  
Florida143  
Illinois144  
Indiana145  
Iowa146  
 
137 Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 800-01 (Alaska 1995); Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 
P.2d 905, 907 (Alaska 1985). 
138 Parra v. Cont’l Tire N. Am., Inc., 213 P.3d 361, 364 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Cal Fed Partners 
ex rel. Cal Fed Syndications v. Heers, 751 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
139 Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Gadbury-Swift, 362 S.W.3d 291, 294-95 (Ark. 2010). 
140 Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 18-21 (Cal. 1991) (en banc). 
141 Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 782 A.2d 103, 111-12 (Conn. 2001). 
142 Blake v. Prof ’l Travel Corp., 768 A.2d 568, 572 (D.C. 2001). 
143 Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1095 (Fla. 2013); Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont’l 
Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1996). 
144 Dawdy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 693-96 (Ill. 2003); McClain v. Ill. Cent. 
Gulf R.R. Co., 520 N.E.2d 368, 372-74 (Ill. 1988). 
145 Anyango v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 971 N.E.2d 654, 659-63 (Ind. 2012). 
146 In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 878-79 (Iowa 1991); Silversmith v. Kenosha 
Auto Transp., 301 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Iowa 1981). 
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State Description 
Kansas147  
Kentucky148  
Maine149  
Maryland150  
Massachusetts151  
Michigan152  
Minnesota153  
Mississippi154  
Missouri155  
Nebraska156  
Nevada157  
New Hampshire158  
 
147 Volt Delta Res., Inc. v. Devine, 740 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Kan. 1987); Envtl. Ventures, Inc. v. 
Alda Servs. Corp., 868 P.2d 540, 546 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
148 Lykins Enters., Inc. v. Felix, Nos. 06-142, 06-624, 2007 WL 4139637, at *4 (Ky. Nov. 21, 
2007); Beaven v. McAnulty, 980 S.W.2d 284, 287-88 (Ky. 1998), superseded on other grounds by KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 452.105 (2000). 
149 Corning v. Corning, 563 A.2d 379, 380 (Me. 1989). 
150 Johnson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 552 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Md. 1989); Nace v. Miller, 28 A.3d 737, 
751-52 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
151 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Estes, 228 N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (Mass. 1967). 
152 Radeljak v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 719 N.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Mich. 2006); Cray v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 207 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Mich. 1973). 
153 Paulownia Plantations de Panama Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 
2009); Bergquist v. Medtronic, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Minn. 1986). 
154 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 728 So. 2d 573, 575-76 (Miss. 1999). 
155 State ex rel. Wyeth v. Grady, 262 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. 2008) (en banc); Anglim v. Mo. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 832 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
156 Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 694 N.W.2d 191, 202 (Neb. 2005). 
157 Eaton v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 616 P.2d 400, 401 (Nev. 1980), overruled on other grounds 
by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 88 P.3d 840 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam). 
158 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 540 A.2d 1230, 1232 (N.H. 1988). 
  
862 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 833 
 
State Description 
New Jersey159  
New Mexico160  
New York161  
North Carolina162  
North Dakota163  
Ohio164  
Oklahoma165  
Pennsylvania166  
Rhode Island167  
South Dakota168  
Tennessee169  
Texas170  
 
159 Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 752 A.2d 708, 710-12 (N.J. 2000); In re Vioxx 
Litig., 928 A.2d 935, 937-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
160 First Fin. Trust Co. v. Scott, 929 P.2d 263, 264 (N.M. 1996); Buckner v. Buckner, 622 
P.2d 242, 243-44 (N.M. 1981). 
161 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 247-48 (N.Y. 1984); In re Oxycontin 
II, 908 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
162 Motor Inn Mgmt., Inc. v. Irvin-Fuller Dev. Co., 266 S.E.2d 368, 371 (N.C. 1980). 
163 Vicknair v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 767 N.W.2d 171, 176-78 (N.D. 2009). 
164 State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 832 N.E.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ohio 
2005) (per curiam); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharm., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 370, 372-74 (Ohio 1988). 
165 Binder v. Shepard’s Inc., 133 P.3d 276, 278-80 (Okla. 2006) (per curiam); Conoco Inc. v. 
Agrico Chem. Co., 115 P.3d 829, 833 (Okla. 2004). 
166 Rini v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 240 A.2d 372, 373-74 (Pa. 1968); Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft 
Co., 2014 PA Super 120, 8-11. 
167 Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1182-85 (R.I. 2008). 
168 Rothluebbers v. Obee, 668 N.W.2d 313, 317-18 (S.D. 2003). 
169 Zurick v. Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Tenn. 1968); Luna v. Sherwood, 208 S.W.3d 
403, 405-06 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
170 Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam). 
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State Description 
Utah171  
Washington172  
West Virginia173  
Wisconsin174  
States Indicating a Willingness to Follow Federal Forum Non Conveniens (3) 
Hawaii The Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized that the 
forum non conveniens inquiry requires an analysis of 
the availability of an alternative forum.175 
Oregon Multiple cases have assumed that district courts can 
use the federal forum non conveniens standard to 
dismiss cases even though it has not been formally 
adopted.176 
Virginia The Virginia Supreme Court has included the Gilbert 
factors in the “good cause” requirement for dismissal 
under forum non conveniens.177 
 
171 Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp. Ltd., 325 P.3d 70, 77-78 (Utah 2014); Summa 
Corp. v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 559 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1977). 
172 Sales v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 177 P.3d 1122, 1124-25 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); Johnson v. Spider 
Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Wash. 1976) (en banc). 
173 Mace v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 714 S.E.2d 223, 231-33 (W. Va. 2011); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
v. Tsapis, 400 S.E.2d 239, 242-44 (W. Va. 1990). 
174 Lau v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 111 N.W.2d 158, 162-63 (Wis. 1961). 
175 See UFJ Bank Ltd. v. Ieda, 123 P.3d 1232, 1240 (Haw. 2005). 
176 See Maricich v. Lacoss, 129 P.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); Novich v. McClean, 18 
P.3d 424, 430 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
177 See Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 520 S.E.2d 164, 170-71 (Va. 1999). 
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State Description 
States that Have Not Yet Adopted a Specific Formulation of the Forum Non 
Conveniens Doctrine (1) 
Idaho Idaho has not yet promulgated a forum non conveniens 
standard because its courts have failed to reach the 
question on procedural grounds.178 
States Adopting More Limited Versions of Forum Non Conveniens (6) 
Alabama Alabama requires that defendants show the plaintiff ’s 
claims arose outside the state before deciding whether 
a more appropriate alternative forum exists.179 
Colorado Colorado has effectively eliminated forum non conven-
iens dismissals in cases brought by resident plain-
tiffs.180 
Delaware Delaware requires defendants to show that they have 
met a range of factors similar to the federal factors and 
to show with particularity that there is an “overwhelming 
hardship.”181 
South Carolina The South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly 
ruled that it is inappropriate to dismiss a case brought 
by a resident plaintiff under forum non conveniens.182 
Vermont Vermont applies forum non conveniens as an “excep-
tion, not the rule” whose “cardinal purpose is to 
prevent the plaintiff from seeking to vex, harass, or 
oppress the defendant by inflicting upon him [unnec-
essary] expenses.”183 
 
178 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 625 P.2d 1098, 1102 (Idaho 1981); Marco 
Distrib., Inc. v. Biehl, 555 P.2d 393, 396-97 (Idaho 1976). 
179 See Malsch v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 916 So. 2d 600, 602 (Ala. 2005). 
180 See McDonnell–Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, 557 P.2d 373, 373-74 (Colo. 1976) (en banc); 
UIH–SFCC Holdings, L.P. v. Brigato, 51 P.3d 1076, 1078-79 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). 
181 See Martinez v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 86 A.3d 1102, 1104 (Del. 2014); Mar-
Land Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean Petrol. Ref., L.P., 777 A.2d 774, 778 (Del. 2001). 
182 See Chapman v. S. Ry. Co., 95 S.E.2d 170, 173 (S.C. 1956). 
183 See Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 510 (Vt. 1976). 
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State Description 
Wyoming The Wyoming courts preclude dismissal as long as the 
suit is “based . . . on rational grounds” and “not 
brought for purposes of harassment.”184 
States Restricting Forum Non Conveniens to a Limited Range of Cases (2) 
Louisiana Louisiana allows forum non conveniens arguments 
only for federal causes of action and specifically 
eliminates its use for cases brought under the Jones 
Act or federal maritime law.185 Louisiana has also 
limited the factors considered for forum non conveniens 
to “convenience of the parties and the witnesses” and 
“the interest of justice.”186 
Georgia The Georgia Supreme Court has limited forum non 
conveniens to cases in which it is authorized by statute 
and cases where nonresidents bring suit for injuries 
that occurred outside the United States.187 
States Questioning Whether the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Is Generally  
Applicable (1) 
Montana Montana does not allow forum non conveniens in 
FELA cases188 and has resisted its application in other 
contexts,189 but has applied the doctrine in at least one 
case.190
 
 
184 See W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991). 
185 See Miller v. Am. Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 617 (La. 1992), aff ’d, 510 U.S. 443 (1994); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 123 (1989). 
186 See Holland v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 48 So. 3d 1050, 1054-55 (La. 2010). 
187 See Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 527, 528-29 (Ga. 2005); AT & T Corp. v. 
Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2001); Holtsclaw v. Holtsclaw, 496 S.E.2d 262, 263 (Ga. 1998). 
188 See Rule v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 106 P.3d 533, 536 (Mont. 2005). 
189 See State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498 (Mont. 1995). 
190 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 329 P.3d 1264, 1271-72 (Mont. 2014) (relying 
heavily on a mandatory contractual forum selection clause to conclude that noncontractual issues 
should be dismissed under forum non conveniens). 
